Book Club Questions for Making Sense of God

1.Keller draws heavily on philosopher Charles Taylor's concept of a 'secular age.' In your own words, what does Taylor (and Keller) mean by this? How is today's secular age different from simply 'a time when fewer people believe in God'?

2.Keller says his goal in this book is not primarily to prove God's existence but to show that Christianity is 'a live, rational, and pertinent option' for modern people. Why does he start here rather than with traditional arguments for God's existence? Do you think this is a wise strategy?

3.Keller notes that secular people often experience belief as simply impossible — not rejected but inconceivable. Have you encountered this 'closed imaginary,' as Taylor calls it, in yourself or in conversations with others? What does it feel like?

1.Keller engages the Freudian charge that religious belief is wish-fulfillment — that we believe because we want it to be true, not because it is true. How does he respond to this argument? Do you find his response persuasive?

2.Keller points out that the wish-fulfillment argument cuts both ways: atheism can equally be accused of being wish-fulfillment, since many people deeply want there to be no God (no moral accountability, no judgment, no demands). How does this move change the shape of the conversation?

3.Keller distinguishes between a 'defeater belief' — a belief that, if true, would make Christianity impossible — and a mere challenge or tension. Why is this distinction important for how we evaluate objections to faith?

1.Keller argues that the sharp dichotomy between 'faith' and 'reason/evidence' is itself a misunderstanding. What does he say faith actually means, both in common usage and in Christian theology? How is the Christian concept of faith different from 'believing without evidence'?

2.Keller points out that scientific reasoning itself depends on foundational beliefs — such as the reliability of sense perception, the uniformity of nature, and the value of truth — that cannot be scientifically proven. What is the significance of this observation for the faith-versus-reason debate?

3.What role does Keller assign to personal experience and testimony in forming rational beliefs? How does this challenge the idea that only laboratory-repeatable evidence counts as real evidence?

1.Keller acknowledges that religious belief has been used to justify terrible violence and injustice throughout history. How does he distinguish between misuse of religion and religion itself? Is this distinction convincing to you, or does it feel like special pleading?

2.Keller argues that the 20th century's most catastrophic violence — under Stalin, Mao, Hitler, and Pol Pot — was carried out by explicitly secular or anti-religious ideologies. What is the implication of this historical observation for the claim that religion is uniquely prone to violence?

3.He distinguishes between violence done in the name of religion and violence that is actually motivated by religion's core teachings. What is the difference? How would you evaluate the Crusades or the Inquisition by this standard?

1.What does Keller mean when he says that treating religion as 'just a personal preference' misunderstands what religion claims? What kind of claims does Christianity actually make, and why do those claims resist being privatized?

2.Keller engages the concept of 'expressive individualism' — the idea that the self is the sovereign source of meaning and that authenticity means living out your inner desires. Where do you see this worldview most powerfully at work in contemporary culture?

3.He argues that 'expressive individualism' is not a neutral or obvious stance but a particular, historically contingent philosophy with its own assumptions. What are some of those assumptions? Do you find them convincing?

1.Keller identifies two competing conceptions of freedom: 'freedom from' (absence of external constraint) and 'freedom for' (the capacity to fulfill your nature and purpose). How does this distinction reframe the question of whether Christianity restricts freedom?

2.He uses the analogy of a fish out of water — a fish is not 'more free' when removed from water; it is less able to thrive. How does this illustration work for the Christian understanding of human freedom and moral design? Where does it succeed as an analogy, and where might it break down?

3.Keller argues that every community and every culture enforces behavioral norms — that there is no 'norm-free' life. What are some of the norms enforced by secular, progressive culture? Are they experienced as constraints by those who don't share them?

1.Keller argues that the supposed warfare between science and Christianity is largely a modern myth — that the relationship has historically been more complex and often more collaborative. What historical evidence does he cite? Were any of these examples new or surprising to you?

2.He distinguishes between science as a method (empirical investigation of the natural world) and 'scientism' (the philosophical claim that science is the only path to truth). Why is this distinction important? Do you think most people who appeal to 'science' against religion are doing science or scientism?

3.Keller points out that many of the foundational assumptions of modern science — the rationality and orderedness of the universe, the reliability of human reason, the value of truth — are not themselves scientifically derivable but fit more naturally within a theistic worldview. How does this argument work? Where do you find it strongest or weakest?

1.Keller argues that the need for meaning is not optional or culturally conditioned — it is a structural feature of human consciousness. What evidence does he offer for this claim? Do you agree that meaning is a genuine need, not just a desire?

2.He surveys the ways secular culture attempts to supply meaning — through work, romantic love, family, moral causes, and personal achievement — and suggests each of these is insufficient on its own. Which of these meaning-sources feels most powerful in your own experience? What are its limitations?

3.Keller engages existentialist thinkers like Sartre who argue that meaning must be self-created since there is no God to supply it. What are the psychological and practical problems with self-created meaning? Why does Keller find it ultimately unconvincing?

1.Keller describes the experience of 'inconsolable longing' — a deep desire for something we cannot quite name or find, which C.S. Lewis called 'Sehnsucht' and which Keller connects to Augustine's famous line about the restless heart. Have you experienced this longing? How would you describe it?

2.He argues that consumer culture promises satisfaction through acquisition and experience but is structurally designed to prevent it — perpetual desire is more profitable than contentment. Do you agree with this diagnosis? Where do you see it most clearly?

3.Keller distinguishes between pleasures that genuinely satisfy (even temporarily) and the deeper longing that no finite pleasure can fill. How does he use this distinction to point beyond the material world? Does this argument depend on a specifically Christian worldview to work, or is it observable to anyone?

1.In this chapter, Keller deepens his earlier discussion of freedom by engaging with the concept of 'moral weight' — the intuition that some choices genuinely matter, that some things are really right or wrong. How does this intuition create a problem for purely secular accounts of freedom?

2.He argues that if human beings are purely the product of nature and environment — if our desires and values are entirely determined by genes and culture — then 'freedom' becomes an incoherent concept. Do you find this argument convincing? What are its implications?

3.Keller explores the paradox that the most deeply 'free' people we admire — those with great moral courage, self-sacrifice, or creative achievement — are almost always people of enormous inner discipline and commitment. How does this complicate the idea that freedom means 'doing what you want'?

1.Keller describes the modern 'identity project' — the pressure to construct and perform a coherent self — and notes that it produces extraordinary anxiety rather than the confidence it promises. Does this description match your observation of culture? Of your own experience?

2.He argues that identity built purely from within (what sociologists call 'achieved identity') is psychologically fragile because it depends on continuous performance and social validation. How have you seen this fragility play out — in yourself or in those you know?

3.Keller draws on the work of Charles Taylor and sociologist Anthony Giddens to describe the burden of 'self-authorship' in modernity. How does the Christian concept of 'received identity' — identity given by God, not constructed by self — offer relief from this burden?

1.Keller observes that one of the most striking features of our secular age is the intensification of moral outrage — the passion for justice, equality, and human rights — even as the philosophical foundations for those values have been eroded. What does he make of this contradiction?

2.He argues that secular accounts of justice ultimately 'borrow capital' from a Christian worldview — appealing to human dignity, universal rights, and moral accountability — without being able to justify those appeals within a purely materialist framework. Do you find this argument convincing? What is the strongest secular response to it?

3.Keller points to the problem of historical evil — atrocities committed by people who are now dead, victims who received no earthly justice. How does the Christian doctrine of final judgment address this in a way that secular progressivism cannot? Does the idea of divine judgment strike you as frightening, comforting, or both?

1.Keller summarizes his cumulative case: Christianity uniquely meets the human needs for meaning, satisfaction, freedom, identity, justice, and hope in ways that secular alternatives cannot match. Looking back over the book, which of these arguments did you find most compelling? Which felt weakest to you?

2.He argues in the conclusion that the cumulative weight of the evidence is not merely that Christianity is 'useful' but that it is actually true — that the God who meets these needs is real. How does he make this move? Is it persuasive to you?

3.Keller acknowledges that arguments alone do not produce faith — that there is a step from intellectual persuasion to personal trust that requires something more. What does he say is required to make that step? How does he describe the experience of moving from 'Christianity makes sense' to 'I believe'?

1.Looking back across all twelve chapters, which single argument, illustration, or idea from Making Sense of God was most impactful for you personally? What made it land so powerfully?

2.Keller's book is structured around six human needs: meaning, satisfaction, freedom, identity, justice, and hope. Which of these do you now understand differently than you did before reading? Which still feels most unresolved for you?

3.Has your relationship to secular culture — its assumptions, its promises, its objections to faith — shifted as a result of reading this book? In what ways are you now better equipped to engage it with both confidence and compassion?